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Relocation to Get Venture Capital: A Resource Dependence Perspective 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a resource dependence perspective, we theorize and show that non-venture-capital-backed 
ventures founded in U.S. states with a lower availability of venture capital (VC) are more likely 
to relocate to California (CA) or Massachusetts (MA)—the two VC richest states—compared to 
ventures founded in states with a greater availability of VC. Moreover, controlling for self-
selection, ventures that relocate to CA or MA subsequently have a greater probability of 
attracting initial VC compared to ventures that stay in their home state. We discuss the 
implications for theory, future research, and practice. 
 
―If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill‖ 
[Bacon, 1625] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The formation of relationships between high-tech ventures and formal venture capital investors 
(VCs) has since long been of interest in the entrepreneurial finance literature. Relationships with 
VCs represent one of the most critical ties of young high-tech ventures that require substantial 
financial resources (Hallen, 2008). Moreover, these relationships are a catalyst for those ventures 
to attract other resources, including skilled labor, and value-added services (Lee, Lee & 
Pennings, 2001). However, the process of raising VC is fraught with difficulties. 
Recent research has advanced our understanding of the resource management actions that 
entrepreneurs take to initiate ties with VCs more efficiently (e.g., Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). 
However, these studies assume that entrepreneurs attempt to secure VC funding while their 
ventures keep operating within their current geographic location, which may be more or less 
munificent. Thus, ventures‘ geographic environment is often treated as a given or unalterable 
once entrepreneurs have made a location choice. This assumption is not limited to the literature 
on VC tie formation, but also characterizes the broader entrepreneurship literature (see, for 
instance, Holmes et al. (2016) and Welter (2007) for a similar observation). In this study, we 
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challenge this assumption and propose that entrepreneurs can relocate their ventures‘ activities to 
the VC richest locations as an effective tactic to raise initial VC.  
The lack of research on venture relocation as a potential resource management action is 
surprising given that multiple scholars have shown that ventures‘ geographic location is an 
important determinant of VC access. Indeed, VC is spatially clustered (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) 
and proximity to VCs eases the process of attracting VC because VCs generally exhibit a ―strong 
local bias in their investment decisions‖ (Cumming & Dai, 2010, pp. 378). To increase our 
understanding of venture relocation as a resource management action, we draw on resource 
dependence theory (RDT). In RDT, entrepreneurs strive to minimize their dependence on 
(prospective) resource providers that control critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). They 
do so because dependence, which is a function of the importance of the resources to the focal 
venture and the extent to which the resources are controlled by relatively few organizations, is 
viewed as a source of vulnerability (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Drawing on RDT, we theorize that non-VC-backed ventures that are founded in states 
with a lower availability of VC are more likely to relocate to CA or MA than ventures founded in 
states with a greater availability of VC. We focus on venture relocations to CA and MA because 
these two states have exhibited the highest VC availability and investment activity for decades 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998; NVCA, 2010).
1
 We further theorize on the effectiveness of relocating 
ventures to CA or MA as a tactic to attract initial VC. Importantly, we do not argue that 
                                                          
1
 In 2009, for example, the total amount of funds committed to the U.S. VC industry equaled $16 billion, of which 
more than $9 billion (56%) was committed to VC funds located in CA and $3.1 billion (20%) to funds located in 
MA. (NVCA, 2010). As we detail below, we also use relative VC availability measures in our paper that control for 
the number of high-tech ventures that operate in a state and thus control for the competition for VC. CA and MA not 
only score the highest in terms of the absolute amount of VC but also in terms of the relative amount of VC 
availability. 
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entrepreneurs relocate their ventures exclusively because of a lack of VC in their home state, but 
rather that VC availability in the home state plays a non-trivial role in relocation decisions. 
We use a large-scale longitudinal dataset of independent, high-tech ventures founded in 
the U.S. between 1995 and 2009. Our findings suggest that non-VC-backed ventures founded in 
states with lower VC availability are more likely to relocate to the two VC richest states, CA and 
MA, compared to those founded in states with greater VC availability. Controlling for self-
selection, we further find that ventures that relocate to CA or MA have a greater probability of 
attracting initial VC compared to ventures that stay in their home state and, interestingly, also 
compared to ventures that were founded in CA or MA. However, we also find that ventures that 
relocate to CA or MA are more likely to fail than those that stay in their home state. Additional 
tests show the robustness of these findings.  
This study makes several contributions. We add to entrepreneurial finance research that 
has examined the actions that non-VC-backed entrepreneurs take to form ties with VCs (e.g., 
Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). We theorize and provide empirical evidence on the effect of 
relocation on the probability of attracting initial VC. More generally, we introduce relocation as 
an unexplored action that allows entrepreneurs to manage environmental dependence, thereby 
adding to RDT (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). In this respect, we elaborate on the idea 
introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) that organizations can ―create‖ a more favorable 
environment. While up to now, RDT studies mainly focus on political actions as a tactic to create 
a favorable environment (e.g., lobbying or appointing politicians to the board of directors), this 
tactic is mainly available to larger, established organizations. For this reason, entrepreneurial 
ventures‘ environment is often treated as a given or unalterable and determines the ―rules of the 
game‖ (e.g., Holmes et al., 2016). Yet, our study highlights that entrepreneurs can and do change 
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their ―playing field‖ by relocating their ventures to environments with more abundant valuable 
resources.  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
RDT depicts organizations as ―open systems‖, which are not self-contained, but rely on their 
environment to obtain resources necessary for survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). While access 
to external resources is a critical challenge for all ventures, this challenge is particularly acute for 
young high-tech ventures, which often lack sufficient internal resources and are confronted with 
an uncertain, dynamic environment (Bradley et al., 2011). The open systems nature of ventures 
causes interdependence, as organizations do not ―entirely control all of the conditions necessary 
for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the actions‖ (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978, pp. 40). This dependence is viewed as a source of vulnerability, which 
organizations seek to minimize (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Dunford, 1987) 
Consistent with RDT, research portrays entrepreneurs as decision makers who use a 
variety of actions to reduce their dependence. These actions may include (1) absorption of 
dependence, where ventures reduce the importance of specific resources, cultivate alternatives, 
or expand domains through integration, mergers or acquisitions; (2) negotiation of dependence, 
where ventures establish cooperative relationships, including interorganizational relationships 
and interlocking directorates; and (3) shaping the environment, for instance through political 
actions by using governmental and judicial channels leading to an environment that is better for 
their interests (Hillman et al., 2009).  
Despite this variety of resource dependence-reducing actions, in RDT entrepreneurs are 
generally assumed to act within the constraints of their ventures‘ existing geographic 
environment. This assumption has also been made in much of the research on network tie 
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formation, access to capital and entrepreneurial clusters. Studies on tie formation and access to 
VC, for instance, often depict entrepreneurs as attempting to secure VC funding while they keep 
operating within their current location, which may be more or less munificent (e.g., Hallen & 
Eisenhardt, 2012). In the literature on entrepreneurial clusters, entrepreneurs are either located in 
such clusters or not and being located in a cluster brings along advantages, such as the 
availability of suppliers, capital providers, skilled labor, regional institutions, but also 
disadvantages, such as increased competition over valuable resources (e.g., Folta, Cooper, & 
Baik, 2006).  
The assumption that entrepreneurs act within the constraints of their ventures‘ existing 
geographic location is surprising because a venture‘s geographic location may be an important 
source of dependence in itself (Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008). Indeed, the dependence of a focal 
venture on other organizations is ―the product of the importance of a given input… and the 
extent to which it is controlled by relatively few organizations‖ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 
51). While venture relocation will not influence the importance of a particular resource for the 
focal venture, it may influence the supply of the resource and the number of organizations that 
control the critical resource, particularly when prospective resource providers are spatially 
clustered. Since geographical proximity facilitates the successful exchange of external resources 
(Schutjens & Stam, 2003; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008), seeking to be close to resources is a 
relevant resource dependency strategy (Galbraith, Rodrigues & DeNoble, 2008). Hence, 
relocation is a possible action entrepreneurs may take to reduce their dependence on any resource 
provider that controls valuable resources. 
In this paper, we examine the relocation of activities to new geographic locations, i.e. a 
tactic by which entrepreneurs change the geographic environment (including the supply of 
8 
 
spatially constrained valuable resources such as VC) in which they operate. Our focus is 
fundamentally different from previous research that examined how existing environments evolve 
(e.g., Feldman, 2014) and how entrepreneurs try to influence their existing environment (e.g., 
Holmes et al., 2017).  
Below, we develop our hypotheses in the context of young, high-tech ventures operating 
in distinct U.S. states characterized by a fundamentally different supply of VC. Although we 
recognize that states represent a relatively broad geographic classification, we focus on venture 
relocation across state borders for two reasons. First, VC investment levels are fundamentally 
different across U.S. states and are still bounded to the state level. Cumming & Dai (2010: 378), 
for instance, find that ―VCs invest predominantly in the new ventures that are located in their 
home states‖. Second, defining each state as a distinct geographic area provides theoretical and 
empirical consistency with prior VC work (e.g., Cumming & Li, 2013; Popov, 2014). Still, we 
acknowledge that there exists within-state variation in the availability of VC as well. Ideally, we 
would also use finer-grained within-state data, but such data is not available for several 
variables; thus, consistent with prior research, we proxy for the unavailability of finer-grained 
geographic data with state-level data. However, it is important to note that within-state 
variability creates ―noise‖ in our study and thus biases our results against finding support for our 
hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESES 
Supply of VC in the Home State and Venture Relocation to CA or MA 
Most entrepreneurs start their ventures in a familiar location (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; 
Michelacci & Silva, 2007). This location often plays an important role in opportunity 
identification and initial venture development, including resource acquisition. However, as 
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ventures develop, they may require access to new resources that are not abundant in their 
existing geographic location, particularly when they have high growth ambitions and are active 
in high-tech industries. VC is one such resource because these ventures often do not generate 
(sufficient) internal funds to finance their growth ambitions (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002a). 
Moreover, other sources of external finance are unsuitable (in the case of debt finance, see 
Carpenter & Petersen, 2002b) or are characterized by smaller average investment amounts (in the 
case of debt finance, see Vanacker & Manigart, 2010; or angel money, see Hellmann, Schure & 
Vo, 2015). Thus, high-tech ventures with high growth ambitions may either directly approach 
VC (Hellmann et al., 2015) or may need to raise VC later-on (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
However, VC is characterized by strong spatial clustering (Cumming & Dai, 2010; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). In the U.S., CA and MA have by far been the two leading states in 
terms of VC fund availability for several decades (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).
2
 The uneven 
spatial distribution of VC is problematic for ventures founded in states characterized by a relative 
paucity of VC because they have lower probabilities of attracting initial VC (Stuart & Sorenson, 
2003). Attracting money from distant regions turns out to be a difficult strategy because VCs 
prefer geographic proximity to their targets. This proximity facilitates venture identification, 
evaluation and post-investment monitoring (Mäkelä & Maula, 2006; Sapienza, Manigart & 
Vermeir, 1996; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Despite progress in telecommunication technologies, 
local presence and face-to-face contact are still favored (Fritsch & Schilder, 2008; Gupta & 
Sapienza, 1992) and VCs require significantly higher rates of return for long-distance 
investments (Chen et al., 2010). 
                                                          
2
 CA and MA are quite diverse in terms of their technological focus and the nature of their VC system, though. 
While CA is highly renowned for its ICT business and VC investors frequently originate from the industry itself, 
MA is characterized by a set of ―technology mini-clusters‖ in a larger number of high-tech industries and a VC 
industry that is dominated by the financial sector (Best, 2015; Hulsinck, Manuel & Bouwman, 2007). However, key 
for our study is that despite their differences both states are by far the VC richest states. 
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VCs themselves may seek to mitigate liabilities related to distance by syndicating with 
local VCs that can act as leads in these deals (e.g., Devigne et al., 2013; Sorensen & Stuart, 
2001). However, in states with a lack of VCs, this initial enabler is almost by definition 
inaccessible. Consequently, most long-distance VC investments also flow to VC rich regions 
(Fritsch & Schilder, 2008), explaining why long-distance investing tends to reinforce the 
geographic concentration of VC investing. Hence, non-VC-backed ventures founded in states 
where VC is scarce will depend on a limited set of prospective VCs and will face significant 
difficulties in accessing initial VC from both local and distant VCs.
3
  
In the spirit of RDT, prior research has shown how entrepreneurs may absorb their 
dependence on VCs. For example, entrepreneurs can resort to financial bootstrapping—
techniques used to reduce the need for external financing (Ebben & Johnson, 2006). Moreover, 
entrepreneurs may cultivate alternatives to VC (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). For example, 
ventures may seek to attract angel money.
4
 However, financial bootstrapping and alternative 
external financing sources, such as angel money, may not be a perfect substitute for VC since 
they may not provide all of the resources necessary for ventures with high growth ambitions 
(e.g., Hellmann et al., 2015; Sapienza, Korsgaard & Forbes, 2003). Indeed, bootstrap finance and 
angel money tend to cover smaller financing needs, but are unlikely to cover all financing needs 
                                                          
3
 We acknowledge that in boom periods, where VCs heavily compete for deal flow (particularly in the VC richest 
states), VCs could become dependent on ventures as well. Thus, it is possible that resource dependence works the 
other way around and pushes VCs to invest over longer distances to get access to good deal flow. However, even 
during country-wide boom periods, VC remains relatively scarce in VC poor states. Thus, ventures in VC poor 
states will still be dependent on a limited set of prospective VCs because even during boom periods geographic 
distance matters (to some extent). Indeed, Cumming and Dai (2013) provide evidence that in general the geographic 
distance between VCs and new ventures has become shorter over the 30-year period of their study and the 1998-
2000 bubble period, for instance, did not cause a shift in this general trend.  
4
 While there are indications that angel money is also spatially clustered (Stangler, Tareque & Morelix, 2016), it is 
more homogeneously spread across the U.S. than VC. However, while progress has been made with respect to the 
collection of angel data at a national level, high-quality data on investments at the state level is still lacking 
(Kauffman Foundation, 2016). In the robustness section, we control for the availability of angel money at the state 
level and our results remain qualitatively similar. Another source of finance that recently gained attention is 
crowdfunding, but as highlighted by Mollick & Robb (2016, pp. 79) ―crowdfunding relaxes geographic constraints, 
but not completely‖. However, this funding source was still in its infancy during the period of our study. 
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as ventures grow (Berger & Udell, 1998). Thus, while entrepreneurs may initially delay (or 
avoid) raising VC to finance their early growth, high-tech ventures with high growth ambitions 
will eventually need to consider searching for VC or, alternatively, they may have to tune down 
their growth ambitions. 
Whereas scholars have focused on tactics that non-VC-backed ventures deploy within 
their current geographic location to reduce dependence on VCs, entrepreneurs should not take 
their VC poor location as given.
5
 The dependence of a focal venture on VCs is a joint function of 
the importance of VC for the focal venture and the extent to which VC funds are controlled by 
relatively few VCs. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, pp. 51), for example, argue that ―a resource that 
is not important cannot create a situation of dependence‖, and importantly ―regardless of how 
important the resource is, unless it is controlled by relatively few organizations, the focal 
organization will not be particularly dependent on any of them‖. Thus, entrepreneurs can relocate 
their ventures‘ activities to states with a greater availability of VC funds as a tactic to reduce 
their dependence on a limited set of prospective VCs in their home state. 
However, RDT also suggests that one tactic will rarely solve all dependence issues and, 
in fact, often creates new dependencies (Pfeffer, 1987). Relocation to a VC richer state may, for 
instance, introduce new dependencies because it radically shifts existing relationships with 
customers, suppliers, and employees (Brouwer, Mariotti & Van Ommeren, 2004; Isabella, 1990). 
In addition to losing ties with existing resource providers, relocating also implies an important 
social cost for entrepreneurs and their family (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; Kulchina, 2016). For this 
reason, entrepreneurs will only be willing to relocate if the perceived benefits of relocation 
outweigh the costs. Hence, if entrepreneurs want to minimize their dependence on prospective 
                                                          
5
 We focus on the relocation decision of ventures that have not yet raised VC. We do so to exclude the possibility 
that VCs push their portfolio companies to relocate, for instance, to facilitate monitoring (e.g., Cumming, Fleming & 
Schwienbacher, 2009). 
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VCs by relocating their ventures, they are especially likely to relocate ventures founded in states 
with a limited availability of VC funds to the VC richest states. The perceived benefits of 
relocating to the VC richest states may not outweigh the costs for ventures founded in states with 
a greater availability of VC funds. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: Non-VC-backed high-tech ventures founded in states with a lower 
availability of VC funds are more likely to relocate to CA or MA, compared to ventures 
founded in states with a greater availability of VC funds. 
Relocation to CA or MA and the Ability to Attract Initial VC Finance 
If entrepreneurs turn out to relocate their non-VC-backed high-tech ventures to the VC richest 
states to diminish their dependence on a limited set of prospective VCs in their home state, a key 
question that emerges is: do relocated ventures have a higher probability of raising VC after 
relocation? We focus on attracting initial VC for the venture because raising follow-on VC 
funding may be the consequence of either having relocated or having raised initial VC (e.g., the 
network of initial VCs is likely to influence follow-on VC funding). Focusing on first rounds 
only hence allows for a cleaner examination of the impact of relocation on the probability of 
raising VC. 
To address the above question, we compare non-VC-backed ventures that relocated to 
CA or MA with (a) those founded outside CA or MA that did not relocate and (b) those founded 
in CA or MA. This dual comparison is important because ventures that relocate to CA or MA 
may restructure their resource dependencies in two distinctive ways. First, the availability of 
location-bounded resources may increase substantially for relocated ventures compared to 
ventures staying outside CA or MA (Knoben, 2011). Second, the accessibility of location-
bounded resources may be more problematic for relocated ventures that lack the local 
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embeddedness of ventures founded in CA or MA (Knoben, Oerlemans & Rutten, 2008). Overall, 
making both comparisons enables us to provide finer-grained insights on the effects of relocation 
to manage resource dependencies.
6
 
Attracting initial VC is a key challenge. VCs face significant time constraints and the 
majority of investment proposals they receive do not get more than a few minutes of their 
attention during a quick screening (Fried & Hisrich, 1994). When entrepreneurs relocate their 
ventures to CA or MA, they alleviate the central issue of distance (Cumming & Dai, 2010) as 
they get close to a large pool of spatially clustered VC funds compared to entrepreneurs that 
remain in their VC poor home state. The VC literature provides ample evidence of VCs that do 
not consider a significant part of their deal flow after a quick screening based on general criteria 
such as the distance between the venture and VC (e.g., Cumming & Dai, 2010; Fried & Hisrich, 
1994; Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). They do so because reduced distance between portfolio 
companies and VCs facilitates selection and value-adding activities (e.g., Gupta & Sapienza, 
1992). Thus, only by relocating their ventures to CA or MA, entrepreneurs may already be better 
able to capture the limited attention of a larger set of VCs, and increase their odds of surviving 
the quick screening, compared to entrepreneurs that remain in less VC rich states.
7
 
Furthermore, relocating to CA or MA may increase the desirability of ventures in the 
selection process relative to ventures that remain in a less VC rich home state. First, ventures that 
relocated to CA or MA are close to a larger set of prospective VCs, thereby enhancing their 
chances to informally meet with these VCs. Relocated entrepreneurs may hence ―develop a 
                                                          
6
 We can never observe the case of what would have happened to relocated ventures if they had not relocated. As we 
detail later, we empirically control for such self-selection issues (Heckman, 1979). Thus, we account for the fact that 
relocated ventures might differ from non-relocated ones in terms of unobservable characteristics (e.g., relocated 
ventures might have had a larger probability of attracting VC because of some unobservable characteristics).  
7
 Nevertheless, relocated ventures may also face increased competition from a higher number of VC-seeking firms 
(e.g. Folta et al., 2006; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). Empirically, we will tackle this issue by using relative VC 
availability measures that correct for the number of high-tech ventures active in a state (and hence incorporate issues 
related to competition for VC funds).   
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network of potential partners who are familiar with and have positive affect for a venture prior to 
its seeking a formal tie‖ (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012, pp. 45). Indeed, when prospective VCs‘ 
informal advice is followed, this may not only improve (perceived) venture quality but also ―co-
opt‖ VCs by engaging them in the venture‘s development (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). Second, 
the VC richness of CA and MA often coincides with the increased presence of other location-
bounded resource providers such as highly skilled employees, consultants, business accelerators 
and councilors (Folta et al., 2006). These resource providers not only enhance opportunities for 
further venture development—thereby increasing the attractiveness of the relocated venture—but 
they also increase a venture‘s ability to encounter and interact with VCs (Amezcua et al., 2013; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Overall, ventures that relocated to CA or MA should not only be able to attract the 
attention of a larger set of VCs compared to ventures that remain in a less VC rich home state, 
relocation will also increase their attractiveness for a larger set of prospective VCs. The 
dependence of relocated ventures on any single VC will hereby decrease. As Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978, pp. 52) note ―when there are many sources of supply…the power of any single one 
[resource provider] is correspondingly reduced‖. Consequently, the relocation to CA or MA 
provides ventures founded outside CA or MA with more opportunities, power, and leverage to 
form ties with a larger set of prospective VCs compared to entrepreneurs of ventures that stay in 
their home state. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2a: For non-VC-backed, high-tech ventures that are founded outside CA or 
MA, ventures that relocate to CA or MA have a higher likelihood of raising initial VC 
than those that stay in their home state.  
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Location-bounded resources, including VC, are equally available for ventures that 
relocated to CA or MA and for ventures that were founded in CA or MA (i.e., ―home-grown‖ 
ventures), given that they share the same geographic location. However, equal resource 
availability does not imply equal resource accessibility. We hypothesize that relocated ventures 
will be at a disadvantage compared to ventures founded in CA and MA to secure initial VC due 
to their more limited embeddedness in their new location.
8
 
One key concern that VCs have during the screening and selection of investment 
proposals is information asymmetry—the situation where entrepreneurs possess information 
about themselves and their opportunities that VCs do not possess (Amit, Brander & Zott, 1998). 
Pre-existing direct and indirect connections between entrepreneurs and prospective VCs provide 
an important mechanism through which information asymmetry problems are overcome in VC 
investing (Shane & Cable, 2002). Pre-existing connections, for instance, provide a fast way to 
obtain private information about the quality of specific entrepreneurs. Consistent with these 
ideas, Shane & Cable (2002) show that both direct and indirect connections between 
entrepreneurs and VCs positively influence the probability of attracting initial VC. Ventures that 
relocated to CA or MA are likely to be at a disadvantage—at least for the first couple of years 
after relocating—relative to home-grown ventures in terms of their local embeddedness.  
When ventures reside in the same geographic location for longer, they create close 
connections with local suppliers, customers and other stakeholders (Brouwer et al., 2004). Thus, 
it will take time and effort for relocated ventures to develop new connections in CA or MA after 
relocating. Further, information from local business connections can enable entrepreneurs to 
scrutinize the interest of VCs in the state, thereby allowing them to approach VCs more 
                                                          
8
 Rather than relocating their ventures‘ activities, entrepreneurs may decide to set up a branch in CA or MA, and 
remain active in their home state at the same time. We come back to this possibility in the robustness section.  
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efficiently (Plummer, Allison & Connelly, 2016). Because of their more limited local 
connections, entrepreneurs from relocated ventures may have less access to such information 
relative to entrepreneurs of home-grown ventures. Moreover, the more limited local connections 
of relocated ventures may hamper the ability of VCs to evaluate the quality of ventures and to 
obtain information on their prior activities (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992), leading to higher levels of 
information asymmetry compared to home-grown ventures. The problem of informational 
asymmetry is particularly severe when making initial investment decisions because venture 
information is uncertain and difficult to verify, the venture‘s strategic direction may still shift 
significantly and there is no track record with respect to what ventures are able to accomplish 
with the money they might receive (e.g., Plummer et al., 2016; Gompers, 1995). Because of their 
more limited local embeddedness, these problems represent hurdles that will be more difficult to 
overcome for relocated ventures relative to home-grown ventures.
9
 Thus, 
Hypothesis 2b: For non-VC-backed, high-tech ventures that are located in CA or MA, 
ventures founded outside CA or MA have a lower likelihood of raising initial VC than 
those founded in CA or MA. 
METHODS 
Data Sources and Sample 
We rely on the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) Database, which provides annual 
geographic, descriptive and performance data on over 44 million U.S. business establishments. 
This data includes industry codes, sales levels, employment levels, ownership type, credit score, 
and location. Several recent studies (e.g., Amezcua, et al., 2013; Levine & Toffel, 2010; 
                                                          
9
 Entrepreneurs can try to limit these problems by relocating relatively quickly after founding. However, our data 
suggests that less than 30% of the firms that relocate to CA or MA do so within the first three years of existence. In 
addition, about half of the ventures in our dataset move to CA or MA between the 4th and the 7th year of existence. 
Thus, quick relocations after founding are uncommon, which may not be surprising given that relocations entail 
direct and indirect costs for ventures as well as important social costs for entrepreneurs. 
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Neumark, Wall & Zhang, 2011; Paglia & Harjoto, 2014) have validated the NETS database. 
Information on VC investments is obtained through Pitchbook, which contains annual 
information on ventures that receive VC. State-level data are gathered from the National Venture 
Capital Association, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
We focus on ventures that were founded as independent entities in the period 1995 to 
2009 within the high-tech industry. Following Hecker (2005), we classify a venture as high-tech 
if it operates in an industry with a technology-oriented employment rate exceeding five times the 
average of other industries. The selection criteria result in a longitudinal unbalanced panel 
dataset with 1,102,710 venture-year observations of 155,435 high-tech ventures. Ventures are 
tracked from founding until 2009. Ventures that cease to report Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) data 
before 2009 (e.g., because of failure) are included in our sample until their final year of 
existence, which minimizes issues of survival bias. Our sample therefore covers a wide range of 
development stages with venture age ranging from 0 to 16 years old and sales levels ranging 
from $124,000 to $11,600,000. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 provides an overview of the distribution of our sample ventures (Panel A), our 
relocations (Panels B and C) and VC finance (Panel D) across U.S. states.
10
  
To test our hypotheses, we use additional sample selection criteria. To test Hypothesis 1, 
we focus on first-time relocations of ventures that did not yet obtain VC. Consistent with our 
econometric approach, which we describe below, ventures drop out of our sample after 
relocation to CA or MA (or any other U.S. state) or after having raised VC for the first time. 
                                                          
10
 Ventures founded in Puerto Rico (741 ventures) and the Virgin Islands (25 ventures) are not included in our main 
analyses due to the limited availability of independent and control variables.  
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Ventures that relocate and receive VC in the same year are also excluded from the sample to 
avoid problems of reverse causality.
11
  
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we track ventures from start-up until the year they receive 
initial VC. Note that as all ventures in our sample are founded in the 1995-2009 period and 
Pitchbook covers this entire period, we capture the first VC round for the venture. Ventures that 
relocate and receive initial VC in the same year are again excluded from the sample. First, we 
compare ventures that stay in their home state to those that moved to CA or MA. Ventures 
founded in CA or MA as well as ventures relocating to other states are excluded as of the year of 
relocation. Second, we compare ventures that were founded in CA or MA to those that moved to 
CA or MA. Those that move are incorporated in our sample as of the year after relocation. 
Consistent with our theory development, we only consider relocations to CA or MA from states 
where VC is less abundant. Relocations between CA and MA are therefore excluded.  
Dependent Variables 
To test Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable is Relocation to CA or MA. This variable is a 
dummy variable, equaling one if a non-VC-backed venture moves to CA or MA and zero 
otherwise. Panel B of Table 1 reports that 4,906 non-VC-backed ventures relocate. As 
highlighted in Panel C of Table 1, 671 (14%) move to CA or MA. Although this is a rare event, 
CA and MA attract a disproportionate number of relocating ventures. The states with the highest 
proportion of ventures relocating to CA or MA are New Hampshire (3%), Nevada (3%), Rhode 
Island (2%), Connecticut (1%) and Utah (1%).  
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, the dependent variable is Venture capital. This variable is 
a dummy variable, equaling one if the venture attracted initial VC in a given year and zero 
                                                          
11
 As we explained before, we do so because VCs might also push their ventures to relocate (Cumming, et al., 2009). 
Five ventures received VC in the year they relocated. As a robustness check, we included these five ventures. The 
results remain unchanged. 
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otherwise. Our sample consists of 2,394 ventures (1.54%) that attracted initial VC between 1995 
and 2009 (Table 1, Panel D). Panel D confirms that VC is spatially clustered: of the 2,394 
ventures that raise VC, 805 (33.6%) are located in CA and 233 (9.7%) in MA, confirming the 
relevance of our focus on relocation to these states.  
Independent Variables  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables. To minimize 
concerns of reverse causality, these variables are lagged by one year. We use inflation-adjusted 
measures and winsorize all continuous variables at the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 To test Hypothesis 1, we first measure VC funds in the state of origin (absolute) as the 
natural logarithm of the amount of VC commitments in a given state in a given year (measured 
in million U.S. dollars (USD)). Table 2 shows that the average (median) level of VC funds in the 
state of origin equals 1.9 billion USD (0.2 billion USD). We also measure VC funds in the state 
of origin (relative) as the amount of VC commitments divided by the total number of active 
high-tech ventures in a given state in a given year (measured in million USD). As such, the 
relative measure of VC fund availability indicates how much every high-tech venture may 
hypothetically raise if VC funds were spread equally across all active high-tech ventures (and 
thus controls for issues related to competition for VC funds). The average (median) level of VC 
funds in the state per high-tech venture equals 90,000 USD (20,000 USD). The large difference 
between average and median values again highlights the huge variance in VC fund availability 
across states and years.  
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To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we rely on the variable Relocation to CA or MA as the 
independent variable. This is a dummy variable, equaling one for ventures that have relocated 
their activities to CA or MA before raising any VC.  
Control Variables  
The relocation models to test Hypothesis 1 control for several venture characteristics from the 
NETS database. Venture size is measured as the natural logarithm of sales in a given year. 
Venture age is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. We 
include these two controls because smaller and younger ventures are less regionally embedded 
(Knoben, 2011). We also include Credit report availability, which indicates whether the venture 
has a D&B PayDex score in a given year. This score is based on trade experiences reported to 
D&B by various vendors. Credit-reporting ventures reduce information asymmetry for resource 
suppliers both in familiar and unfamiliar locations. Venture size, venture age and information 
asymmetry also capture the dynamics proposed in standard models on the evolution of 
entrepreneurial finance (Berger & Udell, 1998). Thus, these variables control for the possibility 
that relocation to a VC cluster may be a natural transition in entrepreneurial development. In 
addition, we control for venture growth and human resource (HR) slack. Venture growth is 
measured as the relative increase in sales and proxies for resource needs. HR slack is measured 
as the number of employees relative to sales, from which the median ratio of employment to 
sales in the industry (at the 4-level NAICS digit score) is subtracted (Bradley et al., 2011). 
Ventures may build up higher levels of HR slack to prepare for future growth and may hence 
require more financial resources (e.g., Welbourne, Neck & Meyer, 1999). 
Other ecosystem advantages, such as a high-quality infrastructure in the home state may 
decrease the probability of relocating (Weterings & Knoben, 2013). Specifically, next to funding, 
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access to ventures operating in the same industry, innovation activities and human capital are 
important spatial resources (Feldman, 2014; Isenberg and Onyemah, 2016). We therefore include 
several proxies for the entrepreneurial infrastructure at the state level in any given year. Industry 
density is measured as the number of ventures active in the same industry (at the 3-level NAICS 
digit score) as the focal venture in a given state in a given year. This variable controls for the 
specialization of labor, suppliers and other input factors in the venture‘s state (Weterings & 
Knoben, 2013). Patents per thousand inhabitants is defined as the number of granted patents per 
thousand inhabitants in a given state in a given year. This variable proxies for knowledge 
spillovers and innovation activity at the state level (Bradley et al., 2011). GDP per capita is 
defined as real GDP per capita for a given state in a given year and controls for the current 
prosperity of the state. The presence of a high-quality workforce is measured by the level of 
educational attainment, operationalized as the number of Science and engineering graduate 
students between 25 and 34 years old per 1,000 individuals. Local banking development is 
measured as the total amount of loans and leases provided by financial institutions per high-tech 
venture. Local banking development is associated with increased financial resource access and 
better loan conditions for entrepreneurs (Deloof & La Rocca, 2015). Finally, the Long term 
capital gains tax rate is defined as the marginal state tax rate on long capital gains and is 
measured through the use of the NBER TAXSIM tax simulation program. A higher capital gains 
tax rate is expected to be negatively related to the attractiveness of the home state (Gompers & 
Lerner, 1998).  
In addition to the state level variables that proxy for the entrepreneurial infrastructure, we 
also control for the proximity to CA or MA by incorporating the dummy variable Neighbor. This 
variable equals one if the venture is founded in a neighboring state of CA or MA. It controls for 
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the familiarity with CA or MA and for the lower cost of relocation for ventures that originate 
from neighboring states (Brouwer et al., 2004). We expect ventures founded in neighboring 
states to have a higher probability of relocation to CA or MA. Finally, all regression models 
capture industry and time effects through the incorporation of industry and year dummies. 
The models that investigate the attraction of initial VC to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
control for venture characteristics that are associated with the investment criteria used by VCs 
(e.g., Fried & Hisrich, 1994) and thus with the likelihood of obtaining initial VC. We need to 
control for these characteristics to be able to disentangle the effects of ―typical‖ VC selection 
criteria from the effects of relocation. Specifically, since VCs target ventures with high growth 
potential, we include Venture growth and HR slack. Venture size and Credit report availability 
proxy for the level of information asymmetries between high-tech ventures and VCs (Sapienza et 
al., 2003; Vanacker, Collewaert & Paeleman, 2013). Lower levels of information asymmetries 
are expected to increase the probability of raising VC (Amit et al., 1998). The operationalization 
of these variables is described above. We further include state fixed effects. These effects control 
for all, even unmeasured, stable differences between states. 
Table 2 shows that the average venture in our dataset is five years old and has $2.2 
million sales (median: $1.1 million). 44% of all ventures have credit reports. The average 
venture has an annual sales growth of 14% (median: 0%) and HR slack level of .54. With respect 
to state level characteristics, Table 2 indicates an average industry density of 3,682: there are, on 
average, 3,682 ventures active in the same (3-digit high-tech) industry and state in a given year. 
The number of patents averages .30 per thousand inhabitants. States have on average 11.59 
science and engineering graduate students per 1,000 individuals. Some 11% of the ventures 
originate from a state adjacent to CA or MA.  
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Method of Analysis 
To test hypothesis 1, we use a Cox proportional hazard model, which predicts the hazard of 
relocation to CA or MA for each of the venture-years. All independent and control variables are 
time-varying. Our Cox proportional hazard models are of the form:  
h(t) = h0(t) exp[BX]  
where h(t) is the hazard rate at time t, h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X is the vector of 
predictors, and B is the vector of estimated coefficients.  
The Cox proportional hazard model estimates an unspecified hazard rate as a function of 
time. In our sample, time corresponds with the age since start-up. As a result, venture age is 
incorporated in our models although not as a separate control. The effects of the independent 
variables are estimated as multipliers of the hazard rate. An advantage of the Cox proportional 
hazard model is that it does not require any parametric assumptions for the hazard function, 
which is suitable for our data as relocation is a rare event. Further, Cox proportional hazard 
models account for the non-independent nature of our panel data (Allison, 1995).  
Cox proportional hazard models are also used to analyze the probability of raising VC 
(Hypotheses 2a and 2b). In this case, we predict the hazard of receiving initial VC for each 
venture-year.  
First, we model the hazard of receiving initial VC for the subsample of ventures founded 
outside CA or MA. We compare the hazard of receiving initial VC of ventures that relocate to 
CA or MA with that of ventures that stay in their home region. Given that relocation to CA or 
MA may not be randomly distributed, we correct for self-selection. While there are several 
approaches to deal with selection issues, we use the Heckman approach (Heckman, 1979; Li & 
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Prabhala, 2007).
12
 We thus start with a probit selection equation, modeling the likelihood of 
venture relocation to CA or MA.
13
 Thereafter, the inverse Mills ratio of the selection equation is 
incorporated as a control for self-selection in our hazard models of interest. The goal of the 
inverse Mills ratio is to capture the effect of unobservable factors that distinguish relocated 
ventures from those that stay in their state of origin. 
Second, we estimate the hazard of receiving initial VC for a subsample of ventures 
located in CA or MA, distinguishing between ventures that relocated towards CA or MA and 
ventures founded in CA or MA. Again, we include an Inverse Mills selection ratio. The goal of 
our selection model in this analysis is to capture unobservable factors that distinguish relocated 
ventures from those that were initially founded in CA or MA. 
FINDINGS 
The Supply of VC in the Home State and Venture Relocation to CA or MA 
Table 3 presents the results of the relocation models. A hazard ratio above one indicates a 
positive effect of the independent variable on the hazard of relocation to CA or MA (less than 
one indicates a negative effect). Model 1 includes the control variables only. Models 2 and 3 
include the absolute and the relative level of VC fund availability in the home state separately (to 
avoid multicollinearity). When VC fund availability is added, the Chi² likelihood ratios of the 
hazard models improve significantly, suggesting that VC availability is a non-trivial predictor of 
relocation to CA or MA. 
                                                          
12
 An alternative approach is to compare ventures that did not relocate to a propensity score matched sample (where 
this matching occurs based on observable variables) of ventures that did relocate. However, this would entail that we 
have a fundamentally different sample for the first part of our paper (where we want to obtain insight on whether a 
lack of VC funds in a venture‘s state of origin pushes ventures to relocate) relative to the second part of our paper 
(where we examine if relocation increases the odds of attracting initial VC). Instead, we prefer to leverage our large-
scale dataset and control for observable differences between relocated and non-relocated ventures through our set of 
control variables. Moreover, the Inverse Mills ratios in our approach also capture possible unobservable differences 
between relocated and non-relocated ventures. 
13
 For briefness, we do not report the detailed selection models but they are available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that ventures founded in states with lower VC availability are more 
likely to relocate to CA or MA compared to ventures founded in states with greater VC 
availability. Models 2 and 3 provide strong support for hypothesis 1, both when measuring VC 
fund availability in absolute (p<.05) and in relative (p<.01) terms. A decrease in the level of VC 
fund availability with one standard deviation increases the hazard of relocation to CA or MA 
with 10% in both models.  
The coefficients of the control variables in Table 3 suggest that relocation to CA or MA 
results from a combination of venture and state characteristics. With respect to venture 
characteristics, the availability of a credit reporting score is positively related to the hazard of 
relocation. Moreover, ventures originating from states with a better entrepreneurial 
infrastructure, as proxied by industry density and long term capital gains tax rate, are less likely 
to relocate to CA or MA. Interestingly, real GDP per capita and local banking development in a 
state both positively affect the likelihood to relocate. Finally, ventures that relocate to CA or MA 
are more likely to originate from neighboring states. Combined, these findings suggest that 
entrepreneurs do not relocate their ventures exclusively because of a lack of VC in their home 
state as other ecosystem advantages (in addition to venture funding) also have an impact. For 
example, a decrease in industry density with one standard deviation increases the likelihood to 
relocate to CA or MA with either 2.9% (in model 2) or 20.0% (in model 3). However, our 
findings show that VC availability in the home state does play a non-trivial role in relocation 
decisions. 
Relocation to CA or MA and the Ability to Attract Initial VC Finance  
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Table 4 presents the models estimating the hazard of raising initial VC. The models in Panel A 
compare relocated ventures with those that stay in their home state (excluding ventures founded 
in CA or MA). The models in Panel B only include ventures located in CA or MA; they compare 
the hazard rate of raising initial VC for relocated versus home-grown ventures. Within each 
Panel, model 1 includes the controls only and the relocation dummy is added in model 2. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that ventures that relocate to CA or MA are more likely to raise 
initial VC compared to those that remain in less VC rich states. Our results provide strong 
support for hypothesis 2a: ventures that move to CA or MA are, ceteris paribus, 3.7 times more 
likely to raise VC than those that remain in their VC poor home state (p < .01). More 
specifically, while only 0.93% of the non-relocated ventures in this subsample raised VC, 3.42% 
of the ventures relocated to CA or MA did so. More than 80% of the ventures that attract initial 
VC after relocation to CA or MA do so within the first three years after relocation, while the 
remaining do so between four and six years after relocation. Hence, in line with our arguments 
on the benefits of relocation as a tactic to reduce resource dependencies, ventures moving to CA 
or MA are indeed better able to form initial ties with VCs than those staying in their home state.  
Hypothesis 2b is not supported, however. While we argued that relocated ventures would 
be less likely to attract initial VC than ventures founded in CA or MA, our findings show the 
opposite. More specifically, the hazard of raising initial VC is 2.1 times higher for ventures 
relocating to CA or MA, compared to home-grown ventures. Relocated ventures are thus more 
likely to attract initial VC despite their lower local embeddedness.
14
  
                                                          
14
 While we highlighted before that we focus on ventures‘ initial VC fundraising, it is interesting to provide some 
additional descriptive statistics on follow-on VC funding. Slightly more than half (53%) of non-relocating ventures 
that attracted initial VC attract follow-on VC rounds. For ventures that relocated to CA and MA and attracted initial 
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The control variables, which represent the ―typical‖ selection variables of VCs, have the 
expected signs. Specifically, lower levels of information asymmetry, proxied by venture size and 
credit report availability increase the hazard of receiving initial VC. Not surprisingly, VCs also 
focus on ventures with substantial growth perspectives: HR slack and—for the subsample of 
ventures located in CA or MA—venture growth have a positive impact on the hazard of raising 
initial VC. Finally, it is worthwhile to examine the Inverse Mills ratios that account for the self-
selection effects of relocation. In the subsample of ventures founded outside CA or MA, the 
significant Inverse Mills ratio suggests that unobservable factors that distinguish relocated 
ventures from those that stay in their VC poor state are (negatively) correlated with attracting 
initial VC. In the subsample of ventures located in CA or MA, the Inverse Mills ratio is not 
significant, indicating that unobservable factors that distinguish relocated ventures from those 
that were initially founded in CA or MA do not significantly influence the attraction of initial 
VC. Taken together, our results suggest that even when controlling for ―typical‖ VC selection 
criteria and potential self-selection effects, relocation is an important determinant of a venture‘s 
ability to attract initial VC.  
Post-hoc Analyses 
So far, our results emphasize the positive effects of relocation to CA or MA. However, RDT also 
suggests that tactics to alleviate resource dependencies will result in novel patterns of 
dependence. As such, a venture will never fully eliminate resource dependencies (Pfeffer, 1987). 
For example, relocation may conflict with the interests of resource providers located in the home 
state of the entrepreneur, such as employees and local business relations (Brouwer et al., 2004). 
Some of these resource providers will not follow the venture to its new location and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
VC this percentage is higher at 60%. Thus, ventures that relocate to CA or MA seem to have additional longer-term 
benefits besides being more likely to raise initial VC.  
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replacement of these providers in the new location is not guaranteed (Isabella, 1990). We 
therefore examine whether relocated ventures are more prone to failure.  
We first model failure rates for ventures founded outside CA or MA, comparing failure 
rates of ventures that relocated to those that stayed in their home state. Second, we model failure 
rates of ventures located in CA or MA, comparing relocated ventures to home-grown ventures. 
Both models include Inverse Mills ratios to control for unobservable characteristics that 
distinguish relocated from non-relocated ventures.  
The dependent variables in these analyses, Failure, is measured as a dummy variable that 
equals one if the venture is reported by D&B to be out of business in a given year. The average 
failure rate amounts to 3.36%, representing 5,228 ventures. Ventures located in CA and MA 
have the highest probability of failing (4.23% and 4.27% respectively). This finding is consistent 
with prior research, which suggests that despite the benefits of being located in these states, 
ventures also suffer from more severe competition between high-tech ventures (Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003). Most ventures tend to fail quite quickly after relocating to CA or MA: 32% of 
the ventures fail within the first year after relocation, another 21% fail in the second year after 
relocation, another 33% in the third and fourth year. Only 16% fail five years or later after 
relocation.  
Panel A of Table 5 shows that ventures relocating to CA or MA are 1.7 times more likely 
to fail than those staying in their home state. Interestingly, our hazard models suggest that VC-
backed ventures have lower failure rates than non-VC-backed ventures. Whereas the former 
group (regardless of having relocated or not) has an average failure rate of 1%, the latter group 
has an average failure rate of 4%. This finding is in line with Puri & Zarutskie (2012), who 
attribute the lower failure rate of VC-backed ventures (particularly in the first years after VC 
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funding) to their increased cash buffers following VC investments. Finally, based on Table 5, 
Panel B we fail to find a difference in failure rates among relocated ventures and home-grown 
ventures in CA or MA. This suggests that a lower level of embeddedness in the new location 
does not increase the probability of failure relative to home-grown ventures. 
As a robustness check, we recoded failure based on all ventures that ceased to be 
registered as active companies in the database, irrespective of the reason why they ceased to exist 
(Tsvetkova, Thill & Strumsky, 2014). More than 38.02% of the sample ceases to exist before the 
end of our sample period, which is highly similar to the failure rate reported in Tsvetkova et al. 
(2014). Results using this alternative measure of failure as the dependent variable are consistent 
with previous results. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Other Robustness Checks 
We fitted multiple additional models to test the robustness of our findings. First, following the 
financial life cycle approach (Berger & Udell, 1998), ventures may receive informal angel 
funding before they raise formal VC. We therefore additionally control for the availability of 
angel funding in the venture‘s state as a robustness check. This information is retrieved from 
Pitchbook data. Findings suggest that even when controlling for the availability of angel funding 
in the state of origin the paucity of VC funding in that state remains a significant predictor of 
relocation to CA or MA. We also point out that stable differences in the availability of angel 
money across states (e.g., ARI Halo Report, 2015) are already incorporated in the main models 
in Table 4 through the state fixed effects. 
Second, instead of using a dummy variable as the dependent variable in the relocation 
analyses, we also used a continuous measure of VC fund availability (both absolute and relative) 
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in the state of destination as alternative dependent variables. A two-step Heckman approach was 
used, with the likelihood to relocate as a selection regression. Conditional upon relocating, we 
find that ventures founded in states with a lower availability of VC are more likely to relocate to 
states with a greater availability of VC. Thus, our results remain robust.  
Related, we also analyzed relocations to CA, MA or NY instead of CA or MA. NY has 
experienced a substantial increase in terms of VC fund availability during our sample period and 
is currently recognized as the third VC center (NVCA, 2015). When including NY as additional 
relocation state, findings are broadly in line with prior results. More specifically, the level of VC 
fund availability has a negative effect on the hazard of relocation to CA, MA or NY (although 
only the effect of the relative level of VC is significant, p<.01). Next, ventures relocating to CA, 
MA or NY are more likely to receive initial VC compared to those that stay in their home state 
(p <.05), although there is no significant difference in the probability of receiving initial VC 
between home-grown and relocated ventures. Hence, while results remain qualitatively similar, 
they are somewhat weaker, which may be due to the fact that NY had considerably less VC 
compared to CA and MA during most of the period of our analysis, hence limiting the benefits of 
relocating to NY as a resource dependence tactic. Overall, these additional tests strengthen our 
earlier claims that ventures relocate to the VC richest states as a dependence-reducing action.  
Third, we acknowledge the heterogeneity of economic activity and VC fund availability 
within CA and MA; the Boston and San Francisco Bay areas are the VC richest areas in these 
states. We therefore added economic area fixed effects instead of state fixed effects when 
comparing the hazard ratios of attracting initial VC for ventures located in CA or MA. These 
fixed effects control for all, even unmeasured (or unobservable) stable differences between areas. 
Findings again remain robust.  
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Fourth, we explored whether opening up a branch in CA or MA could be an alternative, 
less dramatic resource dependence tactic relative to venture relocation. Interestingly, the findings 
show that opening up a branch in CA or MA also increases the likelihood of receiving initial VC 
with 89% (p-value <.05) compared to ventures that remain in their home state. The effect is, 
however, much lower compared to a relocation of activities to CA or MA (as reported in Table 
4), which leads to a 3.7 times increase in the likelihood of raising initial VC. Moreover, ventures 
with a branch in CA or MA are not different from ventures founded in CA or MA in terms of the 
likelihood of receiving initial VC. Hence, opening up a branch may also help to raise initial VC, 
but it is not as effective as relocation. 
Finally, we explored whether other important resources drive relocation, next to 
availability of VC funding, focusing on human capital availability and industry density. These 
robustness tests show that ventures founded in states with a low proportion of science and 
engineering graduate students have a higher probability of relocating to states that excel in terms 
of the number of science and engineering graduates students. Similarly, a low industry density 
stimulates ventures to relocate to states with a high industry density. Taken together, this 
suggests that a lack of resources in a venture‘s founding state is a strong driver of the decision to 
relocate. 
DISCUSSION 
Using an RDT perspective, we investigate venture relocation as an unexplored tactic 
entrepreneurs may use to reduce their dependence on a limited set of VCs in their home state and 
increase their probability of raising initial VC. We show that ventures founded in states with 
lower VC fund availability are more likely to relocate to the VC richest states (i.e., CA or MA) 
thereby reducing the constraints induced by their initial geographic location. In addition, 
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ventures that relocated to the VC richest states are more likely to attract initial VC after 
relocating. These findings highlight that entrepreneurs relocate to the VC richest states as a 
resource dependence tactic. However, our post-hoc analyses also show that relocated ventures 
are more likely to fail relative to ventures that stay in their VC poor home state.  
Our findings have important implications. For the VC literature, we enrich existing 
insights on the role of proximity in VC investment decisions. Whereas earlier studies have 
stressed the importance of proximity to a large pool of VCs for attracting initial VC, we lacked 
insights on whether relocated ventures can benefit from the increased availability of VC in their 
new location. Indeed, given limited local embeddedness, relocated ventures may be at a 
disadvantage relative to home-grown ventures. However, ventures that relocate to the VC richest 
states have a greater probability of attracting initial VC than ventures that remain in VC poorer 
states and, surprisingly, than ventures that are founded in the VC richest states. As such, our 
findings suggest that a lower local embeddedness does not necessarily deter access to VC.  
The surprising finding that ventures that relocate to the VC richest states have a greater 
probability of attracting initial VC than ventures that are founded in these states, may be 
consistent with signaling theory. Relocation is easily observable and difficult or costly to imitate 
by low quality ventures, which are characteristics of credible signals (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Relocation indeed implies a substantial cost, including both direct and indirect costs for the 
venture as well as social costs for the entrepreneur (Michelacci & Silva, 2007). Hence, relocation 
could serve as a signal of unobservable venture quality to VCs because only the ―best‖ 
entrepreneurs (ventures) are likely to relocate (Stam, 2007). Additional tests confirm our 
expectations. Specifically, if signaling is the mechanism driving our result one would 
theoretically expect that signals (i.e., relocations) have stronger effects for ventures characterized 
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by higher uncertainty (e.g., Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Unreported tests show that the effect 
of relocating to CA or MA on the probability of raising initial VC is strongest for ventures with 
lower historical sales growth and younger ventures; two types of ventures for which prospects 
are more uncertain.  
With this study, we also move beyond the dominant focus on initial location decisions 
within the broader entrepreneurship literature. This is important since the majority of these 
studies implicitly assume location to be perpetual rather than subject to change (Carroll & 
Hannan, 1989). Entrepreneurs can, however, decide whether they opt to remain active in the state 
where their initial resource providers are situated or relocate to more munificent states. As such, 
we hope that our findings stimulate future researchers to join our interest in venture relocation 
driven by external resource dependencies.  
Our findings further extend existing evidence on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in VC 
rich states, such as CA or MA. These states are considered very attractive for high-tech ventures, 
even though ventures founded in these regions tend to have higher failure rates (Buenstorf & 
Guenter, 2011; Gilbert, McDougall & Audretsch, 2008). Our findings show that this paradox 
holds not only for high-tech ventures founded in these states, but also applies to relocation 
decisions. Hence, ventures that move to CA or MA are more likely to raise initial VC, but also 
exhibit higher failure rates compared to those that stay in less VC rich states.  
We also contribute to the resource dependence literature. Findings support our general 
claim that entrepreneurs do not only apply resource dependence tactics to manage dependencies 
within the boundaries of their current location, but may also change the location itself as a 
resource dependence strategy. Moreover, while the basic ideas of the resource dependence 
perspective have become ―accepted and taken for granted‖, they are ―not as rigorously explored 
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and tested as it might be‖ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, pp. xxxiii). One such idea is that the tactics 
used to alleviate resource dependencies are likely to produce new patterns of dependence 
(Pfeffer, 1987). Indeed, Hillman et al. (2009) argue that the interrelation of resource dependence 
patterns represents one of the most underdeveloped areas within the resource dependence 
literature. In this respect, our study suggests that the relocation to resource rich locations helps 
ventures to form relationships with important resource providers, in itself a dependence-reducing 
tactic. However, at the same time, relocation to resource rich locations comes at a cost. Ventures 
that relocate to the VC richest states have a higher failure risk compared to those that stay in their 
home state. Overall, we show that tactics to reduce external dependence may have multiple, 
conflicting outcomes and will never fully eliminate all resource dependencies (Pfeffer, 1987).  
Limitations 
Despite our contributions, our paper also has a number of limitations, which may provide 
opportunities for future research. First, we specifically focus on the supply of a very particular 
resource, namely VC. While we do control for other sources of financing, such as bank 
financing, or the availability of angel finance in our robustness checks, we do not capture all 
potential financial resource providers for the high-tech ventures we study. However, compared to 
the above mentioned alternatives, VC is more geographically constrained. VCs also provide 
larger amounts of finance, creating substantial resource dependencies for ventures with high 
growth ambitions. In this respect, we also highlight that our observation period ends in 2009, 
when new sources of entrepreneurial finance, such as crowdfunding, were still in their infancy. 
An interesting question that arises is the role of crowdfunding for ventures founded in VC poor 
regions. Recent literature on crowdfunding suggests that crowdfunding is also spatially clustered, 
but not as much as VC (e.g., Mollick & Robb, 2016).  
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Second, we assumed that a relocated venture would not have the same level of 
embeddedness in its new location as a home-grown venture. Unfortunately, we have no detailed 
insight into what relationships an entrepreneur may have already established in CA or MA prior 
to relocation (e.g., with customers or suppliers). Such data might help future scholars to provide 
finer-grained insight as to when the balance tips in favor of relocating.  
Third, we made the implicit assumption that ventures that receive initial VC have 
accessed such funds from a VC within that state. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to 
validate this assumption. However, since VCs located in CA or MA are known to prefer local 
investing (Chen et al., 2010), we do believe ours is a reasonable assumption to make; i.e. that 
ventures attracting funding from VCs in CA or MA do so from VCs that are also located in CA 
or MA.  
Finally, an interesting avenue for further research is to explore international rather than 
domestic relocations to CA or MA. In addition to earlier studies that focus on international 
relocations of VC-backed ventures (e.g., Cumming et al., 2009), examining international 
relocations of non-VC-backed ventures would enrich the debate on relocation as a resource 
dependence tactic. 
Taken together, an interesting avenue for future research is hence to deepen our 
understanding of the attractiveness of specific eco-systems to entrepreneurs, for example the 
extent to which place, context and potential are factors that encourage geographic mobility. 
Practical Implications 
Our findings provide valuable insights to entrepreneurs and policymakers. For entrepreneurs, our 
findings show that changing one‘s venture location may be an effective strategy to reduce 
dependencies induced by a VC poor home environment. Entrepreneurs can thus increase their 
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odds of attracting initial VC by relocating their ventures. However, entrepreneurs have to bear in 
mind that relocation to attract initial VC is a high-risk strategy. Much like warnings about 
increased competition and congestion effects in VC rich states, our research also points to 
dangers of relocating to such states in the form of higher failure rates. For policymakers, prior 
research has shown that VC poor states suffer from lower start-up rates, but we highlight an 
additional concern; namely, that ventures—once founded—are also more likely to relocate their 
activities out of these states. This additional downside has been largely overlooked by academic 
scholars and practitioners. 
Conclusion 
In sum, extant research has focused on the actions entrepreneurs take to manage their external 
resource dependencies within the constraints of their existing geographic location. We provide 
evidence of an unexplored tactic entrepreneurs can use to reduce their dependence on a limited 
set of VCs in their home state, namely relocating to the VC richest states. Using data on U.S. 
high-tech ventures, we show that ventures founded in states with a lower VC fund availability 
are more likely to relocate to CA or MA. Interestingly, ventures that do so are also more likely to 
attract initial VC compared to those ventures that stay in their home state as well as compared to 
home-grown ventures. Overall, our evidence shows that entrepreneurs do not necessarily take the 
constraints imposed by their geographic environment as given and some may relocate to change 
their ―playing field‖. 
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution across U.S. States  
Distribution of Ventures Founded (Panel A), relocations (Panels B and C) and raised VC finance (Panel D) 
 A B C D 
State Obs % Obs  Probability 
in % 
Obs  (to 
CA/MA) 
Probability 
in % 
Obs Probability 
in % 
AK    287     .18   11          3.83  0 .00  2 .70 
AL  1,599     1.03   49          3.06  3 .19 13 .81 
AR    651     .42   15          2.30  0 .00  2 .31 
AZ  2,963     1.91   70          2.36  14 .47 39 1.32 
CA 27,215   17.51 637          2.34  37 .14 805 2.96 
CO  3,566     2.29   115          3.22  24 .67 70 1.96 
CT  1,797     1.16   114          6.34  22 1.22 38 2.11 
DC  1,004     .65   123        12.25  3 .30 8 .80 
DE    567     .36   50          8.82  3 .53 2 .35 
FL 11,043     7.10   246          2.23  31 .28 55 .50 
GA 5,905     3.80 159 3.83 15 .25 55 .93 
HI    374     .24   8          2.14  2 .53 1 .27 
IA    856     .55   22          2.57  1 .12 5 .58 
ID    559     .36   27          4.83  3 .54 6 1.07 
IL  5,915     3.81   150          2.54  22 .37 83 1.40 
IN  2,102     1.35   51          2.43  7 .33 30 1.43 
KS  1,151     .74   52          4.52  1 .09 12 1.04 
KY  1,129     .73   39          3.45  5 .44 12 1.06 
LA  1,572     1.01   32          2.04  3 .19 11 .70 
MA  5,010     3.22   208          4.15  30 .60 233 4.65 
MD  4,038     2.60   229          5.67  17 .42 43 1.06 
ME    389     .25   8          2.06  2 .51 4 1.03 
MI  4,419     2.84   106          2.40  19 .43 40 .91 
MN  2,522     1.62   68          2.70  10 .40 29 1.15 
MO  2,083     1.34   79          3.79  11 .53 19 .91 
MS    654     .42   21          3.21  0 .00  5 .76 
MT    350     .23   10          2.86  2 .57 3 .86 
NC  3,742     2.41   118          3.15  20 .53 46 1.23 
ND    256     .16   6          2.34  0 .00  1 .39 
NE    505     .32   13          2.57  3 .59 1 .20 
NH    797     .51   43          5.40  25 3.14 14 1.76 
NJ  5,583     3.59   285          5.10  46 .82 56 1.00  
NM    696     .45   29          4.17  3 .43 10 1.44 
NV  1,695     1.09   100          5.90  47 2.77 5 .29 
NY  9,243     5.95   406          4.39  72 .78 108 1.17 
OH  4,317     2.78   120          2.78  16 .37 44 1.02 
OK  1,231     .79   21          1.71  0 .00  8 .65 
OR  1,534     .99   50          3.26  13 .85 17 1.11 
PA  4,790     3.08   174          3.63  22 .46 69 1.44 
PR    741     .48   1          .13  0 .00  0 .00  
RI    359     .23   18          5.01  6 1.67 1 .28 
SC  1,410     .91   37          2.62  2 .14 9 .64 
SD    233     .15   10          4.29  0 .00  3 1.29 
TN  2,195     1.41   47          2.14  1 .05 13 .59 
TX 12,888     8.29   235          1.82  29 .23 149 1.16 
UT  1,802     1.16   60          3.33  21 1.17 31 1.72 
VA  5,585     3.59   270          4.83  22 .39 56 1.00  
VI     25     .02   0      .00     0 .00  0 .00  
VT    216     .14   6          2.78  0 .00  2 .93 
WA  3,455     2.22   103          2.98  30 .87 99 2.87 
WI  1,798     1.16   34          1.89  3 .17 24 1.33 
WV    390     .25   13          3.33  1 .26 3 .77 
WY    229     .15   8          3.49  2 .87 0 .00  
Total 155,435 100.00 4,906          3.16  671 .43 2,394 1.54 
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Table 2 
Sample Description of Venture and State of Origin Characteristics
a 
          Average           Median N (venture years) 
Venture characteristics    
Venture size (in $)
1,2
     2,240,749.00 1,128,960.00 1,086,537 
Venture age
2
                   5.24               5.00 1,088,190 
Credit report availability (Y/N)                     .44  1,088,190 
Venture growth
1
                     .14                .00 932,259 
HR slack                     .54              -1.40 1,086,521 
State of origin characteristics    
VC funds (absolute) in $ mio. 
1,2
             1,905.56            233.75 1,088,190 
VC funds (relative) in $ mio per active high-tech 
venture
1
 
                     .09                 .02 1,088,190 
Industry density
2
            3,681.53        1,471.00 1,088,190 
Patents per thousand inhabitants                     .30                 .27 1,082,979 
GDP per capita (in USD)
1,2
          35,144.26      34,677.00 1,088,190 
Science and engineering graduate students                 11.59              11.20 1,088,190 
Local banking development
2
                 32.40             17.66 1,088,190 
Long term capital tax gains rate                   5.44               4.90 1,088,190 
Neighbor                     .11  1,088,190 
a 
Continuous variables are winsorized on a 5% level. All independent variables are lagged with one year.  
1
Inflation adjusted measures are included in the analyses. 
2
The log of this variable is included in the analyses.
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Table 3 
Hazard Ratios and Standard Errors for Predictors of Relocation to CA or MA
a 
 
Venture relocation to CA and MA 
 (hazard ratio) 
Variables 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 VC funds in the state of origin (absolute)   0.969 *    
   (0.014)     
VC funds in the state of origin (relative)     0.204 ** 
 
    (0.093)   
Venture size 1.014  1.016  1.016  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  
Credit report availability 1.692 ** 1.687 ** 1.690 ** 
 (0.159)  (0.158)  (0.158)  
Venture growth 0.970  0.969  0.970  
 (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.107)  
HR slack 1.002  1.002  1.002   
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)   
Industry density 0.877 ** 0.894 ** 0.889 ** 
 (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.023)  
Patents per thousand inhabitants 1.416  1.598  2.020  
 (0.624)  (0.688)  (0.869)  
GDP per capita 5.544 ** 7.170 ** 9.056 ** 
 (3.153)  (3.927)  (5.097)  
Science and engineering graduate students 0.982  0.990  0.993  
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Local banking development 1.003 * 1.003 ** 1.004 ** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Long term capital gains tax rate 0.921 ** 0.921 ** 0.923 ** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Neighbor 2.266 ** 2.127 ** 2.263 ** 
 (0.236)  (0.222)  (0.230)  
Year fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
     
N (venture years) 759,762   759,762   759,762   
N (ventures) 125,152  125,152  125,152  
Nonzero outcomes 589  589  589 
 Log likelihood -6,533  -6,531  -6,526 
Likelihood ratio Chi² 238.79 ** 247.86 ** 252.54 ** 
Δ Likelihood ratio Chi²   9.07 ** 13.75 ** 
a 
This table presents the hazard ratios of relocation to CA or MA. The sample used in these 
regressions solely consists of ventures that did not yet attract VC. Robust standard errors clustered 
at venture level are reported in parentheses. Significance at 5% and 1% level (two-tailed test) is 
denoted by * and ** respectively. 
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Table 4 
Hazard Ratios and Standard Errors for Predictors of Initial VC Finance
a
 
 
A: Subsample of ventures founded 
outside CA or MA 
B: Subsample of ventures 
located in CA or MA 
Variables 1  2  1  2  
Relocation to CA or MA   3.722 **   2.148 * 
   (0.997)    (0.682)  
Venture size 1.506 ** 1.506 ** 1.325 ** 1.330 ** 
 (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.051)  (0.052)  
Credit report availability 2.533 ** 2.531 ** 2.323 ** 2.320 ** 
 (0.203)  (0.203)  (0.192)  (0.191)  
Venture growth 0.944  0.944  1.143 † 1.151 † 
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.084)  (0.084)  
HR slack 1.022 ** 1.022 ** 1.022 ** 1.022 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Inverse mills (selection effect relocation) 0.354 * 0.363 ** 0.964  1.032  
 (0.107)  (0.109)  (0.055)  (0.060)  
State of origin fixed effects included Yes  Yes  No  No  
State of residence fixed effects included No  No  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
N (venture years) 601,792 601,792 159,261 159,261 
N (ventures) 98,635 98,635 26,868 26,868 
Nonzero outcomes 928 928 745 745 
Log likelihood -9,712 -9,703 -7,106 -7,103 
Likelihood ratio Chi² 905.65 ** 954.96 ** 526.88 ** 529.39 ** 
Δ Likelihood ratio Chi²   49.31 **   2.51 
a 
This table presents results for a set of Cox proportional hazards models capturing the hazard of a non-VC-
backed venture to attract VC. Ventures that already attracted a first round of VC finance are excluded from our 
sample. Panel A focused on ventures founded outside CA or MA and compares ventures that stay within their 
home state to those that moved to CA or MA. Ventures founded in CA or MA are excluded as well as ventures 
relocating to other states (i.e. outside CA or MA). The latter are excluded from the sample as of the year of 
relocation. Panel B focuses on ventures located in CA or MA and compares those that were founded in CA or 
MA to those that moved to CA or MA. Ventures founded in CA or MA that relocate their activities are excluded 
from the sample as of the year of relocation. In both panels, robust standard errors clustered at venture level are 
reported in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed test) is denoted by †, * and ** 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
Hazard Ratios and Standard Errors for Predictors of Venture Failure
a
 
 
A: Subsample of ventures founded 
outside CA or MA 
B: Subsample of ventures 
located in CA or MA 
Variables 1  2  1  2  
Relocation to CA or MA   1.746 *   1.452  
   (0.392)    (0.382)  
Venture size 1.359 ** 1.358 ** 1.485 ** 1.489 ** 
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.042)  
Credit report availability 1.401 ** 1.400 ** 1.580 ** 1.580 ** 
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.102)  (0.102)  
Venture growth 0.792 ** 0.791 ** 0.969  0.970  
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.059)  (0.059)  
HR slack 1.023 ** 1.023 ** 1.036 ** 1.037 ** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
VC financed 0.255 ** 0.254 ** 0.642 † 0.643 † 
 (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.155)  (0.155)  
Inverse mills (selection effect relocation) 0.418 ** 0.419 ** 0.979  1.013  
 (0.091)  (0.092)  (0.044)  (0.050)  
State of origin fixed effects included Yes  Yes  No  No  
State of residence fixed effects included No  No  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
N (venture years) 609,244 609,244 164,269 164,269 
N (ventures) 99,510 99,510 27,324 27,324 
Nonzero outcomes 3,089 3,089 1,183 1,183 
Log likelihood -31,473 -31,470 -10,459 -10,458 
Likelihood ratio Chi² 4,232.78 ** 4,238.80 ** 1,605.53 ** 1,605.03 ** 
Δ Likelihood ratio Chi²  6.02 *   0.50 
a 
This table presents results for a set of Cox proportional hazards models capturing the hazard of a venture to fail. Of those 
ventures founded outside CA or MA, Panel A compares those that stay within their home state to those that moved to CA or 
MA. Ventures relocating to other states (i.e. outside CA or MA) are excluded from the sample as of the year of relocation. 
Of those ventures located in CA or MA, Panel B compares those that were founded in CA or MA to those that moved to CA 
or MA. Ventures founded in CA or MA that relocate their activities are excluded from the sample as of the year of 
relocation. In both panels, robust standard errors clustered at venture level are reported in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% level (two-tailed test) is denoted by †, * and ** respectively. 
 
